This guide describes the reference implementation at its stated update date. Keep the documented support boundary in view as you evaluate or extend it.

Last reviewed: October 23, 2026. Status: synthetic-only alpha.

This guide prepares an exact deployment for review. It is not a compliance certification, a signed agreement, or permission to use patient data. No customer-specific contracts, accounts, or service configurations have been qualified by this repository. The public demo, MCP Local Lab, Assistant Work Lab, recordings, and evaluator exercises use invented patients.

What the approval gate covers

Last asks for a decision before a proposed chart write. It does not gate chart reads. In a model-backed workflow, chart context can leave the FHIR backend for the model or assistant before any write proposal appears. Approving a write does not authorize an otherwise inappropriate disclosure to that service.

The web agent has no separate chart database. That does not mean it avoids patient-data processing. Durable proposals add storage: the opt-in Assistant Work Lab keeps synthetic requests, assistant run progress, work proposals, decisions, and receipts in local SQLite. Its opt-in real agent sends the request and bounded invented chart context to the configured model provider. Its default manual mode and explicit scripted test mode make no provider request. Any future clinical work service must qualify each store, its access controls, retention, and backups explicitly.

Determine the operator's role

Publishing software without access to a customer's PHI does not automatically make its publisher a business associate. Operating a hosted service or accessing PHI for troubleshooting can create that relationship. Confirm who operates Last, who can access data, and on whose behalf each service works. HHS software-vendor guidance

A cloud provider processing or maintaining ePHI on behalf of a covered entity or business associate generally needs the applicable BAA, including a provider holding encrypted ePHI without the key. Determine each relationship rather than treating every recipient of PHI as a business associate. Agreements do not replace the deployment's risk analysis and safeguards. HHS cloud guidance

Data map for review

The table distinguishes implemented paths from proposed integrations. Treat all identifying clinical content as sensitive during deployment review, including free text, resource references, derived summaries, and recordings.

SurfaceCurrent implementation or proposed useData and boundary to qualify
Browser and review UICurrent web chat; separate local Work Lab UIChat, chart results, and proposals appear in browser memory. Review browser extensions, shared workstations, screenshots, caches, session expiry, and identity.
FHIR backendMedplum authenticated path; local HAPI and other evaluation adaptersSource chart and committed resources remain here. Backend access policies govern authenticated FHIR calls. Local HAPI has no clinical authentication.
Last processNext.js chat and FHIR tools; separate opt-in local Work Lab HTTP server and assistant runnerHandles prompts, tokens, chart context, draft payloads, and results. Qualify runtime administrators, network paths, secrets, and request logging. The lab exposes no model tool for a reviewer decision.
Model APIConfigured direct provider in the model-backed web agent and opt-in Work Lab agentReceives prompt and tool results before write approval. The Work Lab sends only its allowed invented patient/result projection plus the user's synthetic request; keys, reviewer sessions, and decision endpoints are not model context. Qualify exact model, endpoint, account, retention, abuse monitoring, region, and contractual coverage. Manual lab mode and explicitly scripted walkthroughs do not call a model.
Remote MCP serverOptional OAuth transportExchanges the caller's token and handles chart results. Host support for elicitation does not authenticate the human reviewer. Review the separate remote MCP evidence and limits.
Assistant hostMuse/Grok Bot integrations proposed, not proven hereCould retain chat, tool results, memories, files, computer state, and logs. A connector transfers data to that host even if Last stores no transcript.
Durable work storeImplemented only in the opt-in synthetic Work LabLocal SQLite holds requests, assistant run progress, proposals, proposal hashes, role identifiers, decisions, states, and commit receipts. The default .lastehr/work-lab/work.sqlite contains both work and assistant-run tables; include SQLite sidecar files and disk backups in retention and cleanup. Owner-only file permissions are not encryption or clinical identity.
Agent executionExisting AI SDK stack in the local Work Lab; eve reference worker remains proposedThe local runner calls the configured direct model and bounded read/proposal tools. A future executor may also retain checkpoints, traces, sandbox files, and subagent context. Inventory each store and every provider it calls before enabling it.
Audit and provenanceExisting optional FHIR audit/provenance; local lab state/receiptsCurrent audit features are not a complete authenticated clinical audit trail. Determine record contents, access, integrity, retention, and failure behavior. A receipt proves a bounded outcome, not clinical correctness.
Logs, analytics, and monitoringServer errors; optional demo analyticsError summaries can retain error-message content. Bounded analytics events are not evidence that all platform logging is PHI-free. Inspect actual log samples and disable unqualified tracking on clinical surfaces. See metrics.
Infrastructure and supportOperator-selected hosting, proxy, database, backups, and support accessReview TLS termination, request inspection, storage snapshots, disaster recovery, support tickets, incident tools, CI artifacts, and deletion. Do not put PHI in builds, demos, issues, or public repositories.

For a proposed clinical deployment, replace this map with the actual endpoints, accounts, regions, administrators, retention periods, and contractual owners. Record outbound calls from the exact configuration; do not infer the data path from the framework name.

Service qualification findings

These are public-document findings, not verified customer agreements. Recheck them when selecting a deployment because eligible products and terms change.

ServiceFinding as of October 23, 2026Decision for this project
Meta MuseCustom connectors exchange task-related data. We have not verified a Muse-specific BAA or PHI-eligible configuration. Meta connector documentationSynthetic integration only until exact coverage is established.
Grok BotCursor offers Enterprise BAAs, but the public eligible-services list does not name Grok Bot. Signed scope and the HIPAA configuration guide control. Cursor BAA documentationDo not infer Bot coverage from a Cursor or xAI API agreement. Synthetic only here.
xAI APIEnterprise Terms §11.1 require a prior BAA and use of the ZDR-enabled API for PHI. Enterprise TermsA possible separately contracted model path, not an approved configuration or evidence about Grok Bot.
Vercel hosting and AI ServicesHosting BAAs are offered. The current AI Services AUP prohibits processing PHI; general hosting coverage must not be assumed to cover an AI service. Hosting guide, AUP §3Obtain explicit service/configuration coverage and resolve restrictions before any clinical deployment.
MedplumPublic BAA and compliance materials apply to the hosted environment; self-hosting is separate. Medplum HIPAA documentationConfirm exact hosted agreement or qualify the self-hosted infrastructure. This does not cover Last's other services.
eveSelf-hosted deployment and configurable providers are documented. Its runtime choice provides no automatic HIPAA qualification. Self-hosting guideInventory model, workflow persistence, sandbox, traces, and hosted dependencies if we add it.
Cloudflare or another network intermediaryNo exact account, service scope, configuration, or executed agreement has been reviewed for a clinical Last deployment.Qualify actual proxy/tunnel/CDN/logging services rather than assuming brand-level coverage. The Work Lab uses loopback and needs no tunnel.

Technical evidence needed before a clinical pilot

The Work Lab demonstrates selected mechanics using synthetic data. A clinical deployment requires additional evidence for its own configuration:

  • A documented data and egress inventory matching a pinned release and actual services; tests for unexpected model, tracing, analytics, and network calls.
  • Organization-managed identities, appropriate MFA, tenant and patient access checks, reviewer authorization, session expiry, revocation, and independent separation between assistant submission and human decisions.
  • Review of the exact immutable proposal revision; policy and authorization checks at commit; no assistant tool that can manufacture human approval.
  • Commit reconciliation after lost responses, duplicate prevention, and tested cancellation, expiry, failure, and restart behavior. Concurrent or uncertain outcomes must not be reported as a confirmed save.
  • Protected transport and storage, managed keys and secrets, bounded logging, tested audit integrity, least-privilege administrative access, and a defined retention/deletion policy including replicas, traces, and backups.
  • Tested restoration, incident detection, access review, patching, and safe deployment/rollback procedures with assigned owners.

These are engineering review items, not a complete legal checklist. Document the design and test evidence rather than checking a feature-name box.

Organizational and contractual evidence

Assign privacy and security responsibility. Complete and maintain a risk analysis and risk-management plan, workforce access/training procedures, incident and breach response, contingency planning, and applicable policies. Record which responsibilities belong to the customer and each service operator. HHS Security Rule summary

Have the deployment owner and qualified healthcare privacy counsel confirm the parties' roles, permitted use, required agreements, and configuration restrictions. Other applicable health/privacy rules and clinical obligations also need review for the intended workflow. Do not treat this repository or a vendor's marketing badge as that determination.

Deployment review record

Create one private record per proposed clinical configuration. Do not place patient information, secrets, or executed agreements in this public repository.

FieldEvidence to attach privately
Release and purposeCommit/version, operator, customer, workflow, intended users, and permitted data
Roles and service inventoryCovered-entity/business-associate analysis; exact products, accounts, endpoints, regions, subprocessors, and support access
AgreementsExecuted applicable agreements, eligible-service restrictions, retention settings, and responsibility allocation
Data map and controlsActual egress, storage/backup inventory, access model, encryption, audit, deletion, and incident procedures
VerificationSynthetic end-to-end, authorization, restart/reconciliation, log inspection, restoration, and revocation results
Open findings and decisionNamed risk owners, unresolved items, review date, and explicit pilot decision for this configuration

The current decision is synthetic evaluation only. A real-patient pilot remains pending this exact-configuration review; there is no automatic switch from a passing lab or a signed BAA to clinical readiness.

Public demonstrations and contributor materials

Use wholly invented patients for videos, templates, screenshots, fixtures, support requests, and integration exercises. Removing a name from a real chart does not by itself establish de-identification. Describe demonstrated controls precisely: separate lab roles, a reviewed payload, and a verified FHIR result. Do not advertise HIPAA certification or production Muse/Grok compatibility based on this lab.

See SECURITY.md for private vulnerability reporting and Assistant Work Lab for the runnable synthetic boundary.

Want a concrete starting point?

Run the limited synthetic HAPI walkthrough before connecting a real backend.

Run locally